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IS ETHICS A MATTER OF KNOWLEDGEBY WALLACE H. PROVOST JR.
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To be ethical is to be the kind of person who does the right
thing at the right time for the right reason. Are such ethical
actions the outcome of knowledge? In other words, does a person
do an ethical act because of something he knows about it? The
outcome perhaps, or the side effects? If we search back into the
earliest years of our western heritage, we find that one
fundamental belief of the ancient Greeks was that man was a
rational animal living in a rational world. One implication of
this belief is that it made man the only animal that could
understand the world through the use of his reason. As Socrates
and Plato saw it, that gave man an awesome responsibility. Since
man is rational his purpose for being in the world must be
rational. Therefore right actions were right because they were
determined through rational thought. For Socrates this meant
reasoning through dialectical argument, through the give and take
of men committed to thinking rationally. However, there is a
fundamental problem which a dialectical argument concerning
ethical actions must overcome. That problem is that moral
concepts do not lend themselves to rational argument. Socrates
most famous student, Plato, believed that ethics, or as the
Greeks put it, virtue, was knowledge. At the same time he was
cognizant of the problem of proving it through rational
argument. In the dialog "Euthyphro," Plato brought the
problem
out in the open where it could be examined. When the "Euthyphro"
opens Socrates was shown talking outside the Athenian "Hall of
the King", where the magistrate adjudicates complaints against
the state religion. He was about to face the Athenian 500 on
charges of impiety, the charge that was to lead to his death by
hemlock. The young man he was talking to was Euthyphro, who was
noted for his knowledge of religious laws and traditions.
Euthyphro told Socrates that he was bringing a charge against his
own father, a charge of murder. The argument concerns the
meaning of the term piety. However, very much the same kind of
arguments can be made concerning any moral concept, justice for
example, or courage. We begin our look at the "Euthyphro"
immediately after the young man has told Socrates that he was
there to bring a charge of murder against his own father.
Socr. Was the man your father killed a relative of yours? But of course, he was. You would never have prosecuted your father for the murder of a stranger? Notice that all ethical concepts are linked. In this case there is a linkage between piety and justice. It is important too that we see that in this dialog Plato treats ethical concepts as though they were entities on their own. This treatment makes the act itself wrong regardless of the circumstances surrounding it. At the turn of the twentieth century G. E. Moore labeled this the "Naturalistic Fallacy." We will examine the reasoning behind that later. The question concerning whether we can say that there is or there is not an entity we can label "Piety" or "Justice," or any other ethical concept is too complex a question to be answered in the terms available to ancient Greeks. However, the problem is particularly important to the argument between Socrates and Euthyphro. If ethics is knowledge, as Plato believed it to be, and as anyone who wishes to attach definitions to ethical terms must believe, then it must be something that can be known. Socr. And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you understand divine things and piety and impiety so accurately that, in such a case as you have stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself may be doing something impious? The problem is of particular importance to Socrates because he is about to face the jury on just such a charge. Euthyphro, being an acknowledged expert in these affairs, should be offering him a way out of his dilemma. Thus Socrates pushed him for a clear and less ambiguous definition of piety and impiety. Socr. Tell me, then, what is piety and what is impiety? The state Gods in fourth century Greece represented two things to the Greek people. First they represented the powers of the universe. This was the rational view that was becoming more popular. Second, they formed the characters in morality stories. This was the irrational element that formed much of the cultural memories of the people. Plato's school, as did Socrates before him, represented the rational view. The decline of the power of the irrational at the time of Plato allowed him to make such derogatory statements concerning the stories of the Gods. Euth. Yes, Socrates, and more besides. As I was saying, I will report to you many other stories about divine matters, if you like, which I am sure will astonish you when you hear them.It is typical that many problems in ethical discussions revolve around specific acts which are purported to be or not to be moral rather than the meaning of the terms themselves. Most people believe they have clear standards of moral behavior, but to describe to anyone else exactly what the criteria is that makes them moral often exceeds the capability of the individual. If Piety, Justice, Courage, and all other ethical concepts are entities in themselves that can be known, then one should be able to clearly define what is right and what is wrong through the application of clear criteria. Socr. Well, then, explain to me what is this characteristic that I may have it to turn to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions and those of other men, and be able to say that whatever actions resemble it is pious and whatever does not is not pious.This argument points out a important distinction between moral and amoral concepts. Amoral concepts are simply true or false and one can refer to definitions and authorities to determine which. Moral arguments, on the other hand are not derived from observation. One cannot point out that they are true or false. Unless, that is, they can be reduced to clear definitions. Socr. Then the same thing is hated by the gods and loved by them; and the same thing will be displeasing and pleasing to them.This point of view makes the meaning of piety hinge on the meanings of moral terms such as justice, honor, and the good. And we can see that even if we acknowledge that Plato is making an implied slander against the traditional religion by forcing Euthyphro to repeat that the gods disagree like ordinary humans concerning the meaning s of these terms, it is obvious that moving from term to term does not result in understandable definitions. Thus he returned to the basics of the argument, the meaning of piety and impiety. Socr. We shall know that better in a little while, my good friend. Now consider this question. Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?In Plato's concept of dialectical argument, the proper use of language is extremely important. Since such argument implies the application of reasoning, the terms must be made clear. Plato realized that language, as it is used in normal conversation, lacked the preciseness required for pure logical development. He felt that it was important that the meanings being applied by the participants be clearly recognized. Socr. Is not that which is being loved in a state either of becoming or of being affected in some way by something?And so we see that Euthyphro's argument has come about in a full circle. It is no wonder that at this point he suddenly remembered an errand he was supposed to attend to. This argument is inconclusive, the best it can show us is the difficulty that must be overcome if we are to show that ethics is a matter of knowledge. Plato, of course, staunchly maintained this. And he defended it in the dialogue "Protagoras". The questions that were pondered in Plato's Protagoras were; is virtue knowledge, and can virtue be taught. Protagoras' position was that virtue and knowledge are different things and that virtue can be taught. Socrates, on the other hand, held that virtue is knowledge, but that it could not be taught. Keep in mind that Protagoras and the other Sophists claimed to be teaching virtue, thus the outcome of the argument was not trivial to them. The best way to see the two points of view clearly is to look directly at the argument. First we can look at Socrates' case for virtue as knowledge. Socrates; Do you think then that a man would be living well who passed his life in pain and vexation?Plato's idea of the "Good" was unique. He said that the "Good" was what illuminated what was good in the same way that the sun illuminates what is visible. This makes "Good" an abstract concept. In this sense good is a term we use to designate some particular thing to be one of the class of things that we recognize as being desirable, proper, right, etc. We recognize them, Plato maintained, because they have been illuminated, brought to our realization, by the Good. Thus, if we see the problem in this sense we cannot deny what Plato implies, that pleasures, being desirable, are thus good. Many more modern ethical philosophers have made this point. That there is something good about an action simply because it is pleasurable and something evil about an action simply because it is painful. Few have given as clear and powerful an argument as Plato did why pleasure and pain, though they are good and evil in themselves, do not automatically lead to good and evil. Socrates; Meaning by pleasure, what partakes of pleasure or gives it?We cannot ignore the difference between Plato's statement and that of Protagoras. Plato said that the pleasant simply due to the fact that it is pleasant is good. What Protagoras said was that this implied that pleasant and good are the same. It is obvious that the statement of Protagoras cannot be implied from that of Socrates. Since this is a rational argument we cannot set that aside. Protagoras; It is for you to take the lead since you introduced the subject.The Socratic method of inquiry, which Plato learned from his master, uses dialectical argument to bring out inner hidden meanings behind propositions. Socrates never wrote things down because he felt that it is only through live communication, person to person, that understanding can be brought out. He believed that his method of teaching was to bring out knowledge that already existed in the mind of his adversary. In other words he believed that all knowledge has existed since eternity in the mind of every man. All that was necessary was for the right kinds of questions to be asked so that knowledge hidden deep in the individual could be brought out where he could use and understand it. Socrates; I wonder then, if we can make it clear to ourselves like this. If a man were trying to judge, by external appearance, of another's health or some particular physical function, he might look at his face and hands and then say: "Let me see your chest and back too, so that I may make a more satisfactory examination." Something like this is what I want for our present inquiry. Observing that your attitude to the good and pleasant is what you say, I want to go on something like this: Now uncover another part of your mind, Protagoras. What is your attitude to knowledge? Do you share the common view about that also? Most people think, in general terms, that it is nothing strong, no leading or ruling element. They don't see it like that. They hold that it is not the knowledge that a man possess that governs him, but something else --now passion, now pleasure, now pain, sometimes love, and frequently fear. They think of knowledge as a slave, pushed around by all the other affections. Is this your view too, or would you rather say that knowledge is a fine thing quite capable of ruling a man, and that if he can distinguish good from evil, nothing will force him to act otherwise than as knowledge dictates, since wisdom is all the reinforcement he needs.Note how skillfully Protagoras is forced to follow Socrates' lead. This method gave Socrates a harsh reputation among powerful Athenians. Inevitably they would be drawn into such arguments and forced unwittingly to renounce their own beliefs. But that is not what Socrates had in mind. Since he believed that each man already has all knowledge buried in his mind, he believed he was leading men to realize pure knowledge they already possessed. Protagoras; No, you are right. Carry on as you have begun.By now you should see the direction the argument is going. It is the same with pains. Some pains, such as from physical exercise, lead to long term pleasures. The point he finally made was that every person is motivated by the desire for pleasure and the abhorrence of pain. These things are illuminated by the "Good" and therefore good or evil in themselves. However, if a person has knowledge of the long term consequences of an act, he would know which would lead to evil and which would lead to good. He would choose the long term good and avoid the long term evil even though he knew they would bring momentary pain or pleasure. Virtue, for Greeks of this period was a measure of a person's tendency to do the right things and avoid the wrong. It also concerned all of the things he does in life and not just those things we consider allied with the virtues today. Therefore virtue is a form of knowledge, a knowledge of ultimate outcomes. Our western society is based on the idea that man is rational. One implication of this is that if a man knows what actions are best for him to take he will, because of his power of reason, choose to do those actions. In the seventeenth century a Dutch philosopher, Spinoza, put the same idea in more modern terms. As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him--I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavor as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that the whole is greater than the parts.We can make the implication from both Plato and Spinoza that it is natural for a man to do what he knows is best for him. Therefore, since ethical acts always lead to the best outcomes in the long run being ethical implies the knowledge of outcomes. Spinoza considered this a basic part of a man's nature. Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of ones own nature (IV Def. viii), and as no one endeavors to preserve his own being except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavor to preserve ones own being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly, and lastly, that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external cause repugnant to their nature.That leaves us with another thorny problem. Socrates just proved that virtue is knowledge, but he also said that it cannot be taught. Protagoras, on the other hand claimed it was not knowledge at all, but at the same time he claimed that it could be taught. Does this make sense? To understand why it does we need to look closely at Plato's theory of knowledge. Notice that I am turning now from Socrates to Plato. There is a general agreement among scholars that the Socrates in the Protagoras is probably consistent with the Socrates of real life. Beyond that, however, the identification becomes more speculative. We will be looking at the Meno which Plato probably wrote after his first visit to Syracuse and the ideas in it should probably be attributed to Plato rather than Socrates. At least this is the more conservative view. At the end of the Protagoras Socrates finally admitted that he did not know what virtue was. The Meno begins when Meno, a somewhat notorious politician, asked the same question, what is virtue. The argument drifted then to another question, what is knowledge. Then Meno proposed an interesting dilemma. "One can never find out anything new: either one knows it already, in which case there is no need to find it out, or else one does not, and in that case there is no means of recognizing it when found." The way out of this dilemma suggested by Socrates is based on the Pythagorean concept of the immortal soul. If one can never know anything new and at the same time it is certain we are always learning new things, then learning must be a matter of recollection. In the Meno Plato demonstrated his theory with a young ignorant slave boy. By asking the lad leading questions he was able to show that the boy knew certain mathematical theorems. Plato claimed that before the soul entered the body at birth it existed in another world of pure forms but at birth forgot these. From then on learning was simply a matter of recollecting what one forgot at birth. However, we will not get into that in this work. Remember that if we think of ethical notions as entities in themselves, and we must if we are going to consider ethics a matter of knowledge, then they must be something we discover. But, they are not entities that exist in the physical world. Therefore we must find them elsewhere. In the Republic Plato used these ideas to answer the question, "Is it better to be just." THRASYMACHUS' CHALLENGEThis is Thrasymachus' challenge. As moral westerners we would like to reject it. But can we. He went on to explain that any government, whether a tyranny, a democracy, or an aristocracy, makes laws for it's own interest, not for the interest of the people. Socrates disagreed. No art or science, he said, considers the interest of the subject. The art of the shepherd is to care for the sheep, the art of the physician is to help the patient, the art of horsemanship is to improve the horses. Thus the art of governing is the improvement of the governed. Thrasymachus answered that Socrates was wrong. The shepherd is not considering the interest of the sheep, his only concern is for the price of the wool or the value of the meat on his table. the ruler is not concerned with the subjects. He is concerned with the collection of taxes. His laws are to cause the simpler and the weaker to bend to the will of the stronger. The just, he said, is always the loser in comparison with the stronger and the unjust. Consider a partnership. When it breaks up it is always the unjust, the stronger, that will receive more of the proceeds. The unjust too will pay less taxes on the same income than the just. The just man in office who, because he is just, suffers a loss becomes hated by his friends for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. The highest form of the unjust is the criminal. Criminals, it turns out, are the happiest of men while those that suffer from their misdeeds because they are just are miserable. And what about the most unjust government, tyranny, what about those who by fraud and by force take away the property of others not little but wholesale. Acts which if they were detected singly would result in punishment or disgrace? When a man, besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, such a man is termed happy and blessed not only by the citizens, but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of justice. GLAUCON'S CHALLENGE (GYGES RING) Glaucon, feeling that Thrasymachus had given in to Socrates with too little fight countered with a more devastating challenge. He said that men do not practice justice of their own free will. They practice justice only when they are forced to. Second, he said that the life of the unjust is better than the life of the just. To prove his point he brought up the myth of Gyge's ring. Now that those who practice justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see where desire will lead them; then we shall discovering the very act the just and the unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into the assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outward and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result --when he turned the collet inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he likes out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at least to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks he can safely be unjust there he is unjust. For men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice.Glaucon went on to tell what could be implied from these facts. That the unjust man is happier and lives a better life than the just. Given full opportunity to commit unjust acts, even the normally just man would succumb. If not he would live an unhappy life knowing all of the opportunities he has missed. Now if we are to form a real judgement of the life of the just and the unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is this isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man be entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skillful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody); for the highest reach of injustice is: to be deemed just when you are not. therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honors and rewards; therefore let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in the state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences, and let him continue thus until the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the utmost of extreme, the one of justice, the other of injustice, let judgement be given which of them is the happier of the two.If it is known that a man is just, that he does just acts as a matter of normal routine, he will be treated well and honored. Thus he will live a happy life. But is he being honored because he does just acts? Or is he being honored because people think he does just acts. If the second, then his happiness is not derived from his justice. It is derived from his apparent justice. Therefore, in order that we can determine if in fact a person lives a happy life because he is just and for no other reason, we must consider the man who is perfectly just but who is thought to be unjust. On the other hand, the unjust man must not be known to be unjust or else he will be vilified for what people think of him and not for what he is. Suppose that we give the power possessed by Gyges ring to two people. One who is absolutely just and the other who is absolutely unjust. Which of the two would live the happier life? Or, if we are to prove Plato's case, can we show that the just man even under these circumstances lives a happier life. However, we are not through yet because Glaucon's brother brought out another problem. Adeimantus objection "Parents and tutors" Adiemantus said, "are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just; but why? Not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation." More is made of appearance by these people than any others. Therefore it is the appearance of justice that is honored and not justice. But still, he went on, we haven't gotten to the root of the matter. He went on; Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about justice and injustice which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honorable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They also say that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call the wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and in private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant profits go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by gods of making atonement for a man's own or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices and charms, with rejoicing and feasts; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost, with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will.Adeimantus then went on to show additional evidence that the gods could be dissuaded from inflicting penalties on the unjust so that with injustice accompanied by the proper obeisance to the Gods, man can have the best of both worlds. Finally, he went on to back up his brother Glaucon's claims. For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But, if though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself.The bulk of the Republic is concerned with Plato's description of the ideal state. In his ideal state Plato recognized the need for a division of labor such that each person would be free to do that which he is most adapted for. He also recognized the need for men who would pursue their own interests and thus enrich the state as a whole. But where he found the greatest difficulty was in the rulers and in the military. These, he said, must be a different breed of men. Thus he offered a class of guardians. These would not be allowed to own land so they would not be tempted to use their power to take from others. They would not be allowed to marry to prevent jealousies, and they would be given a rigorous training designed to make them heroic yet just. From this class of guardians the most philosophic would be chosen as the rulers. His purpose is to develop a picture of an ideal state that could be examined with the express intention of showing that such a state would be analogous to an ideal man. In this way by examining the condition of various states including the ideal state one could determine if in fact the unjust man would be happier than the just. So let us skip to the end of the Republic where Plato sums up what he has been developing all this while. He began by going back to the thoroughly unjust man of Glaucon and Adiemantus. His first argument is that since he has shown that the life of a person is much like the life of a state. Since in a state ruled by a despot, the people are miserable, it must be that the despot himself must be have a miserable life. To sum up, then: this worse type of man is he who behaves in waking life as we said men do in their dreams. The born despot who gains absolute power must come to this, and the longer he lives as a tyrant, the more this character grows upon him.Plato's first argument for the idea that the just man is quite clear. That if you were to know him well so that you could sense the underlying currents in his personality, you would see that he is happier than the unjust man is based on two points. First, that the constitution of a man is much like the constitution of a state. And second, that we can look into a state in more detail because it is larger, and see that in an unjust state the people who make up the state are miserable while in the most just state they are happy. Also, the most just and therefore the most happy state is that ruled by a philosopher king as described in the bulk of the Republic. Next he went on to give a second and more powerful argument why the just man is happier than the unjust man who seems to be just. Very well, said I; that may stand as one of our proofs. But I want to consider a second one, which can, I think, be based on our division of the soul into three parts, corresponding to the three orders in the state. Each part seems to me to have its own form of pleasure and its peculiar desire; and any one of the three may govern the soul.Finally, he said that the desires of both the gain-loving and the ambitious part of our nature will win the truest pleasures of which they are capable only if they accept the guidance of knowledge and reason and pursue only those pleasures which wisdom approves. Such pleasures will be true and proper to their particular nature, to what is best for their real self. On what ground can we say that it is profitable for a man to be unjust or self-indulgent or to do any disgraceful act which will make him a worse man, though he gain money and power. Or how can it profit a wrongdoer to escape detection and punishment? He will only grow still worse; whereas if he is found out, chastisement will tame the brute in him and lay it to rest, while the gentler part of him is set free; and thus the entire soul, restored to its native soundness will gain, in the temperance and righteousness which wisdom brings, a condition more precious than the strength and beauty which health brings to the body, in the proportion as the soul itself surpasses the body in worth.To summarize, if ethics is a matter of knowledge, then the person who has this knowledge will realize that living a rational life in accordance with what is best in the long run will necessarily live the happiest life. Plato's ethical theory leads to the idea of virtue as a way of life enlightened by perfect ethical ideals toward which the human life is directed. It calls for a sublimation of the immediate in favor of an ideal which can only be known through pure reasoning concerning ideal and perfect ends. |